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Abstract Bayesian hypothesis testing presents an attrac-
tive alternative to p value hypothesis testing. Part I of this
series outlined several advantages of Bayesian hypothesis
testing, including the ability to quantify evidence and the
ability to monitor and update this evidence as data come
in, without the need to know the intention with which
the data were collected. Despite these and other practical
advantages, Bayesian hypothesis tests are still reported rel-
atively rarely. An important impediment to the widespread
adoption of Bayesian tests is arguably the lack of user-
friendly software for the run-of-the-mill statistical problems
that confront psychologists for the analysis of almost every
experiment: the t-test, ANOVA, correlation, regression, and
contingency tables. In Part II of this series we introduce
JASP (www.jasp-stats.org), an open-source, cross-platform,
user-friendly graphical software package that allows users
to carry out Bayesian hypothesis tests for standard statistical
problems. JASP is based in part on the Bayesian analyses
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implemented in Morey and Rouder’s BayesFactor pack-
age for R. Armed with JASP, the practical advantages of
Bayesian hypothesis testing are only a mouse click away.
Keywords Hypothesis test · Statistical evidence · Bayes
factor · Posterior distribution
As demonstrated in part I of this series, Bayesian inference
unlocks a series of advantages that remain unavailable to
researchers who continue to rely solely on classical infer-
ence (Wagenmakers et al., 2017). For example, Bayesian
inference allows researchers to update knowledge, to draw
conclusions about the specific case under consideration, to
quantify evidence for the null hypothesis, and to monitor
evidence until the result is sufficiently compelling or the
available resources have been depleted. Generally, Bayesian
inference yields intuitive and rational conclusions within a
flexible framework of information updating. As a method
for drawing scientific conclusions from data, we believe
that Bayesian inference is more appropriate than classical
inference.
Pragmatic researchers may have a preference that is less
pronounced. These researchers may feel it is safest to adopt
an inclusive statistical approach, one in which classical and
Bayesian results are reported together; if both results point
in the same direction this increases one’s confidence that
the overall conclusion is robust. Nevertheless, both prag-
matic researchers and hardcore Bayesian advocates have
to overcome the same hurdle, namely, the difficulty in
transitioning from Bayesian theory to Bayesian practice.
Unfortunately, for many researchers it is difficult to obtain
Bayesian answers to statistical questions for standard sce-
narios involving correlations, the t-test, analysis of variance
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(ANOVA), and others. Until recently, these tests had not
been implemented in any software, let alone user-friendly
software. And in the absence of software, few researchers
feel enticed to learn about Bayesian inference and few
teachers feel enticed to teach it to their students.
To narrow the gap between Bayesian theory and
Bayesian practice we developed JASP (JASP Team, 2017),
an open-source statistical software program with an attrac-
tive graphical user interface (GUI). The JASP software
package is cross-platform and can be downloaded free of
charge from www.jasp-stats.org. Originally conceptualized
to offer only Bayesian analyses, the current program allows
its users to conduct both classical and Bayesian analyses.1
Using JASP, researchers can conduct Bayesian inference by
dragging and dropping the variables of interest into analysis
panels, whereupon the associated output becomes avail-
able for inspection. JASP comes with default priors on the
parameters that can be changed whenever this is deemed
desirable.
This article summarizes the general philosophy behind
the JASP program and then presents five concrete examples
that illustrate the most popular Bayesian tests implemented
in JASP. For each example we discuss the correct interpre-
tation of the Bayesian output. Throughout, we stress the
insights and additional possibilities that a Bayesian anal-
ysis affords, referring the reader to background literature
for statistical details. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of future developments for Bayesian analyses
with JASP.
The JASP philosophy
The JASP philosophy is based on several interrelated design
principles. First, JASP is free and open-source, reflecting
our belief that transparency is an essential element of sci-
entific practice. Second, JASP is inferentially inclusive,
featuring classical and Bayesian methods for parameter
estimation and hypothesis testing. Third, JASP focuses on
the statistical methods that researchers and students use
most often; to retain simplicity, add-on modules are used
to implement more sophisticated and specialized statisti-
cal procedures. Fourth, JASP has a graphical user interface
that was designed to optimize the user’s experience. For
instance, output is dynamically updated as the user selects
input options, and tables are in APA format for conve-
nient copy-pasting in text editors such as LibreOffice and
Microsoft Word. JASP also uses progressive disclosure,
which means that initial output is minimalist and expanded
1Bayesian advocates may consider the classical analyses a Bayesian
Trojan horse.
only when the user makes specific requests (e.g., by tick-
ing check boxes). In addition, JASP output retains its state,
meaning that the input options are not lost – clicking on
the output brings the input options back up, allowing for
convenient review, discussion, and adjustment of earlier
analyses. Finally, JASP is designed to facilitate open sci-
ence; from JASP 0.7 onward, users are able to save and
distribute data, input options, and output results together as
a .jasp file. Moreover, by storing the .jasp file on a pub-
lic repository such as the Open Science Framework (OSF),
reviewers and readers can have easy access to the data
and annotated analyses that form the basis of a substantive
claim. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the OSF has a JASP pre-
viewer that presents the output from a .jasp file regardless
of whether the user has JASP installed. In addition, users
with an OSF account can upload, download, edit, and sync
files stored in their OSF repositories from within JASP. The
examples discussed in this article each come with an anno-
tated .jasp file available on the OSF at https://osf.io/m6bi8/.
Several analyses are illustrated with videos on the JASP
YouTube channel.
The JASP GUI is familiar to users of SPSS and has
been programmed in C++, html, and javascript. The infer-
ential engine is based on R (R Development Core Team,
2004) and –for the Bayesian analyses– much use is made
of the BayesFactor package developed by Morey and
Fig. 1 The JASP previewer allows users to inspect the annotated
output of a .jasp file on the OSF, even without JASP installed and
without an OSF account. The graph shown on the cell phone displays
the Anscombosaurus (see http://www.thefunctionalart.com/2016/08/
download-datasaurus-never-trust-summary.html). Figure available at
https://osf.io/m6bi8/ under under a CC-BY license
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Fig. 2 JASP screenshot for the two-sided test for the presence of a correlation between the relative height of the US president and his proportion
of the popular vote. The left panel shows the data in spreadsheet format; the middle panel shows the analysis input options; the right panel shows
the analysis output
Rouder (2015) and the conting package developed by
Overstall and King (2014b). The latest version of JASP uses
the functionality of more than 110 different R packages; a
list is available on the JASP website at https://jasp-stats.org/
r-package-list/. The JASP installer does not require that R is
installed separately.
Our long-term goals for JASP are two-fold: the primary
goal is to make Bayesian benefits more widely available
than they are now, and the secondary goal is to reduce
the field’s dependence on expensive statistical software
programs such as SPSS.
Example 1: a Bayesian correlation test
for the height advantage of US Presidents
For our first example we return to the running example
from Part I. This example concerned the height advantage of
candidates for the US presidency (Stulp, Buunk, Verhulst,
& Pollet, 2013). Specifically, we were concerned with the
Pearson correlation ρ between the proportion of the pop-
ular vote and the height ratio (i.e., height of the president
divided by the height of his closest competitor). In other
words, we wished to assess the evidence that the data pro-
vide for the hypothesis that taller presidential candidates
attract more votes. The scatter plot was shown in Figure 1 of
Part I. Recall that the sample correlation r equaled .39 and
was significantly different from zero (p = .007, two-sided
test, 95% CI [.116, .613]); under a default uniform prior, the
Bayes factor equaled 6.33 for a two-sided test and 12.61 for
a one-sided test (Wagenmakers et al., 2017).
Here we detail how the analysis is conducted in JASP.
The left panel of Fig. 2 shows a spreadsheet view of the
data that the user has just loaded from a .csv file using the
file tab.2 Each column header contains a small icon denot-
ing the variable’s measurement level: continuous, ordinal,
or nominal (Stevens, 1946). For this example, the ruler icon
signifies that the measurement level is continuous. When
loading a data set, JASP uses a “best guess” to determine the
measurement level. The user can click the icon, and change
the variable type if this guess is incorrect.
2JASP currently reads the following file formats: .jasp, .txt, .csv (i.e.,
a plain text file with fields separated by commas), .ods (i.e., OpenDoc-
ument Spreadsheet, a file format used by OpenOffice), and .sav (i.e.,
the SPSS file format).
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After loading the data, the user can select one of several
analyses. Presently the functionality of JASP (version 0.8.1)
encompasses the following procedures and tests:
• Descriptives (with the option to display a matrix plot for
selected variables).
• Reliability analysis (e.g., Cronbach’s α, Gutmann’s λ6,
and McDonald’s ω).
• Independent samples t-test, paired samples t-test, and
one sample t-test. Key references for the Bayesian
implementation include Jeffreys (1961), Ly, Verhagen,
and Wagenmakers (2016a, b), Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, and Iverson (2009) and Wetzels, Raaijmakers,
Jakab, and Wagenmakers (2009).
• ANOVA, repeated measures ANOVA, and ANCOVA.
Key references for the Bayesian implementation include
Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012), Rouder,
Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, and Wagenmakers
(in press), and Rouder, Engelhardt, Mc-Cabe, and
Morey (in press).
• Correlation. Key references for the Bayesian implemen-
tation include Jeffreys (1961), Ly et al. (2016b), and Ly,
Marsman, and Wagenmakers (in press) for Pearson’s
ρ, and van Doorn, Ly, Marsman, and Wagenmakers
(in press) for Kendall’s tau.
• Linear regression. Key references for the Bayesian
implementation include Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde,
and Berger (2008), Rouder and Morey (2012), and
Zellner and Siow (1980).
• Binomial test. Key references for the Bayesian imple-
mentation include Jeffreys (1961) and O’Hagan and
Forster (2004).
• Contingency tables. Key references for the Bayesian
implementation include Gunel and Dickey (1974) and
Jamil et al. (in press).
• Log-linear regression. Key references for the Bayesian
implementation include Overstall and King (2014a) and
(2014b).
• Principal component analysis and exploratory factor
analysis.
Except for reliability analysis and factor analysis, the above
procedures are available both in their classical and Bayesian
form. Future JASP releases will expand this core function-
ality and add logistic regression, multinomial tests, and a
series of nonparametric techniques. More specialized statis-
tical procedures will be provided through add-on packages
so that the main JASP interface retains its simplicity.
The middle panel of Fig. 2 shows that the user selected a
Bayesian Pearson correlation analysis. The two variables to
be correlated were selected through dragging and dropping.
The middle panel also shows that the user has not speci-
fied the sign of the expected correlation under H1 – hence,
JASP will conduct a two-sided test. The right panel of Fig. 2
shows the JASP output; in this case, the user requested and
received:
1. The Bayes factor expressed as BF10 (and its inverse
BF01 = 1/BF10), grading the intensity of the evidence
that the data provide for H1 versus H0 (for details see
Part I).
2. A proportion wheel that provides a visual representation
of the Bayes factor.
3. The posterior median and a 95% credible interval, sum-
marizing what has been learned about the size of the
correlation coefficient ρ assuming that H1 holds true.
4. A figure showing (a) the prior distribution for ρ under
H1 (i.e., the uniform distribution, which is the default
prior proposed by Jeffreys (1961) for this analysis; the
user can adjust this default specification if desired),
(b) the posterior distribution for ρ under H1, (c) the
95% posterior credible interval for ρ under H1, and
(d) a visual representation of the Savage-Dickey den-
sity ratio, that is, grey dots that indicate the height of
the prior and the posterior distribution at ρ = 0 under
H1; the ratio of these heights equals the Bayes factor for
H1 versus H0 (Dickey & Lientz, 1970; Wagenmakers,
Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010).
Thus, in its current state JASP provides a relatively com-
prehensive overview of Bayesian inference for ρ, featuring
both estimation and hypothesis testing methods.
Before proceeding we wish to clarify the meaning of the
proportion wheel or “pizza plot”. The wheel was added to
assist researchers who are unfamiliar with the odds formula-
tion of evidence – the wheel provides a visual impression of
the continuous strength of evidence that a given Bayes fac-
tor provides. In the presidents example BF10 = 6.33, such
that the observed data are 6.33 times more likely under H1
than under H0. To visualize this ratio, we transform it to
the 0-1 interval and plot the resulting magnitude as the pro-
portion of a circle (e.g., Tversky, 1969, Figure 1; Lipkus &
Hollands, 1999). For instance, the presidents example has
a ratio of BF10 = 6.33 and a corresponding proportion of
6.33/7.33 ≈ 0.86;3 consequently, the red area (representing
the support in favor of H1) covers 86% of the circle and the
white area (representing the support in favor of H0) covers
the remaining 14%.
Figure 3 gives three further examples of proportion
wheels. In each panel, the red area represents the support
that the data y provide for H1, and the white area repre-
sents the complementary support for H0. Figure 3 shows
3With equal prior odds, a ratio of x corresponds to a proportion of
x/(x + 1).
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Fig. 3 Proportion wheels visualize the strength of evidence that a
Bayes factor provides. Ratios are transformed to a magnitude between
0 and 1 and plotted as the proportion of a circular area. Imagine the
wheel is a dartboard; you put on a blindfold, the wheel is attached to
the wall in random orientation, and you throw darts until you hit the
board. You then remove the blindfold and find that the dart has hit the
smaller area. How surprised are you? The level of imagined surprise
provides an intuition for the strength of a Bayes factor. The analogy is
visualized in the Appendix
that when BF10 = 3, the null hypothesis still occupies a
non-negligible 25% of the circle’s area. The wheel can be
used to intuit the strength of evidence even more concretely,
as follows. Imagine the wheel is a dart board. You put on
a blindfold and the board is attached to a wall in a random
orientation. You then throw a series of darts until the first
one hits the board. You remove the blindfold and observe
that the dart has landed in the smaller area. How surprised
are you? We propose that this measure of imagined surprise
provides a good intuition for degree of evidence that a par-
ticular Bayes factor conveys (Jamil, Marsman, Ly, Morey,
& Wagenmakers, in press). The top panel of Fig. 3, for
instance, represents BF10 = 3. Having the imaginary dart
land in the white area would be somewhat surprising, but
in most scenarios not sufficiently surprising to warrant a
strong claim such as the one that usually accompanies a
published article. Yet many p-values near the .05 boundary
(“reject the null hypothesis”) yield evidence that is weaker
than BF10 = 3 (e.g., Berger & Delampady 1987; Edwards,
Lindman, & Savage 1963; Johnson, 2013; Wagenmakers
et al., 2017; Wetzels et al., 2011). The dart board analogy is
elaborated upon in the Appendix.
The proportion wheel underscores the fact that the Bayes
factor provides a graded, continuous measure of evidence.
Nevertheless, for historical reasons it may happen that a dis-
crete judgment is desired (i.e., an all-or-none preference for
H0 or H1). When the competing models are equally likely
a priori, then the probability of making an error equals the
size of the smaller area. Note that this kind of “error con-
trol” differs from that which is sought by classical statistics.
In the Bayesian formulation the probability of making an
error refers to the individual case, whereas in classical pro-
cedures it is obtained as an average across all possible data
sets that could have been observed. Note that the long-run
average need not reflect the probability of making an error
for a particular case (Wagenmakers et al., 2017).
JASP offers several ways in which the present analysis
may be refined. In Part I we already showed the results of
a one-sided analysis in which the alternative hypothesis H+
stipulated the correlation to be positive; this one-sided anal-
ysis can be obtained by ticking the check box “correlated
positively” in the input panel. In addition, the two-sided
alternative hypothesis has a default prior distribution which
is uniform from −1 to 1; a user-defined prior distribution
can be set through the input field “Stretched beta prior
width”. For instance, by setting this input field to 0.5 the
user creates a prior distribution with smaller width, that is,
a distribution which assigns more mass to values of ρ near
zero.4 Additional check boxes create sequential analyses
and robustness checks, topics that will be discussed in the
next example.
Example 2: a Bayesian t-test for a kitchen roll
rotation replication experiment
Across a series of four experiments, the data reported in
Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) provided support for the
hypothesis that clockwise movements induce psychologi-
cal states of temporal progression and an orientation toward
the future and novelty. Concretely, in their Experiment 2,
one group of participants rotated kitchen rolls clockwise,
whereas the other group rotated them counterclockwise.
While rotating the rolls, participants completed a ques-
tionnaire assessing openness to experience. The data from
Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012) showed that, in line with
their main hypothesis, participants who rotated the kitchen
rolls clockwise reported more openness to experience than
participants who rotated them counterclockwise (but see
Francis, 2013).
4Statistical detail: the stretched beta prior is a beta(a, a) distribution
transformed to cover the interval from −1 to 1. The prior width is
defined as 1/a. For instance, setting the stretched beta prior width
equal to 0.5 is conceptually the same as using a beta(2, 2) distribution
on the 0-1 interval and then transforming it to cover the interval from
−1 to 1, such that it is then symmetric around ρ = 0.
Psychon Bull Rev (2018) 25:58–76 63
Fig. 4 The experimental setting from Wagenmakers et al. (2015): (a) the set-up; (b) the instructions; (c) a close-up of one of the sealed paper
towels; (d) the schematic instructions; Photos (e) and (f) give an idea of how a participant performs the experiment. Figure available at https://
www.flickr.com/photos/130759277@N05/, under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
We recently attempted to replicate the kitchen roll exper-
iment from Topolinski and Sparenberg (2012), using a
preregistered analysis plan and a series of Bayesian analyses
(Wagenmakers et al., 2015, https://osf.io/uszvx/). Thanks
to the assistance of the original authors, we were able to
closely mimic the setup of the original study. The apparatus
and setup for the replication experiment are shown in Fig. 4.
Before turning to a JASP analysis of the data, it is infor-
mative to recall the stopping rule procedure specified in the
online preregistration form (https://osf.io/p3isc/):
“We will collect a minimum of 20 participants in
each between-subject condition (i.e., the clockwise
and counterclockwise condition, for a minimum of 40
participants in total). We will then monitor the Bayes
factor and stop the experiment whenever the critical
hypothesis test (detailed below) reach a Bayes factor
that can be considered “strong” evidence (Jeffreys,
1961); this means that the Bayes factor is either 10
in favor of the null hypothesis, or 10 in favor of the
alternative hypothesis. The experiment will also stop
whenever we reach the maximum number of partici-
pants, which we set to 50 participants per condition
(i.e., a maximum of 100 participants in total). Finally,
the experiment will also stop on October 1st, 2013.
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From a Bayesian perspective the specification of this
sampling plan is needlessly precise; we nevertheless
felt the urge to be as complete as possible.”
In addition, the preregistration form indicated that the
Bayes factor of interest is the default one-sided t-test as
specified in Rouder et al. (2009) and Wetzels et al. (2009).
The two-sided version of this test was originally proposed
by Jeffreys (1961), and it involves a comparison of two
hypothesis for effect size δ: the null hypothesis H0 postu-
lates that effect size is absent (i.e., δ = 0), whereas the
alternative hypothesis H1 assigns δ a Cauchy prior centered
on 0 with interquartile range r = 1 (i.e., δ ∼ Cauchy(0, 1)).
The Cauchy distribution is similar to the normal distribution
but has fatter tails; it is a t-distribution with a single degree
of freedom. Jeffreys chose the Cauchy because it makes the
test “information consistent”: with two observations mea-
sured without noise (i.e., y1 = y2) the Bayes factor in favor
of H1 is infinitely large. The one-sided version of Jeffreys’s
test uses a folded Cauchy with positive effect size only, that
is, H+ : δ ∼ Cauchy+(0, 1).
The specification H+ : δ ∼ Cauchy+(0, 1) is open to
critique. Some people feel that this distribution is unrealis-
tic because it assigns too much mass to large effect sizes
(i.e., 50% of the posterior mass is on values for effect size
larger than 1); in contrast, others feel that this distribution
is unrealistic because it assigns most mass to values near
zero (i.e., δ = 0 is the most likely value). It is possible
to reduce the value of r , and, indeed, the BayesFactor
package uses a default value of r = 12
√
2 ≈ 0.707, a value
that JASP has adopted as well. Nevertheless, the use of a
very small value of r implies that H1 and H0 closely resem-
ble one another in the sense that both models make similar
predictions about to-be-observed data; this setting therefore
makes it difficult to obtain compelling evidence, especially
in favor of a true H0 (Scho¨nbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleit-
ner, & Perugini, in press). In general, we feel that reducing
the value of r is recommended if the location of the prior
distribution is also shifted away from δ = 0. Currently JASP
fixes the prior distribution under H1 to the location δ = 0,
and consequently we recommend that users deviate from
the default setting only when they realize the consequences
of their choice.5 Note that Gronau, Ly, and Wagenmak-
ers (2017) recently extended the Bayesian t-test to include
prior distributions on effect size that are centered away from
zero. We plan to add these “informed t-tests” to JASP in
May 2017.
5For an indication of how Bayes factors can be computed under
any proper prior distribution see http://jeffrouder.blogspot.nl/2016/01/
what-priors-should-i-use-part-i.html, also available as a pdf file at the
OSF project page https://osf.io/m6bi8/.
We are now ready to analyze the data in JASP. Read-
ers who wish to confirm our results can open JASP, go to
the File tab, Select “Open”, go to “Examples”, and select
the “Kitchen Rolls” data set that is available at https://
osf.io/m6bi8/. As shown in the left panel of Fig. 5, the
data feature one row for each participant. Each column
corresponds to a variable; the dependent variable of inter-
est here is in the column “mean NEO”, which contains
the mean scores of each participant on the shortened 12-
item version of the openness to experience subscale of the
Neuroticism–Extraversion–Openness Personality Inventory
(NEO PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Hoekstra, Ormel, & de
Fruyt, 1996). The column “Rotation” includes the crucial
information about group membership, with entries either
“counter” or “clock”.
In order to conduct the analysis, selecting the “T-test”
tab reveals the option “Bayesian Independent Samples T-
test”, the dialog of which is displayed in the middle panel
of Fig. 5. We have selected “mean NEO” as the depen-
dent variable, and “Rotation” as the grouping variable. After
ticking the box “Descriptives”, the output displayed in the
right panel of Fig. 5 indicates that the mean openness-to-
experience is slightly larger in the counterclockwise group
(i.e., N = 54;M = .71) than in the clockwise group (i.e.,
N = 48; M = .64) – note that the effect goes in the
direction opposite to that hypothesized by Topolinski and
Sparenberg (2012).
For demonstration purposes, at first we refrain from spec-
ifying the direction of the test. To contrast our results with
those reported by Wagenmakers et al. (2015), we have set
the Cauchy prior width to its JASP default r = 0.707 instead
of Jeffreys’s value r = 1. We have also ticked the plotting
options “Prior and posterior” and “Additional info”. This
produces the plot shown in the right panel of Fig. 5. It is
evident that most of the posterior mass is negative. The pos-
terior median is −0.13, and a 95% credible interval ranges
from −0.50 to 0.23. The Bayes factor is 3.71 in favor of H0
over the two-sided H1. This indicates that the observed data
are 3.71 times more likely under H0 than under H1. Because
the Bayes factor favors H0, in the input panel we have
selected “BF01” under “Bayes Factor” – it is easier to inter-
pret BF01 = 3.71 than it is to interpret the mathematically
equivalent statement BF10 = 0.27.
After this initial investigation we now turn to an analysis
of the preregistered order-restricted test (with the exception
of using r = 0.707 instead of the preregistered r = 1).
The output of the “Descriptives” option has revealed that
“clock” is group 1 (because it is on top), and “counter” is
group 2. Hence, we can incorporate the order restriction in
our inference by ticking the “Group one > Group two” box
under “Hypothesis” in the input panel, as is shown in the
middle panel of Fig. 6.
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Fig. 5 JASP screenshot for the two-sided test of the kitchen roll repli-
cation experiment (Wagenmakers et al., 2015). The left panel shows
the data in spreadsheet format; the middle panel shows the analysis
input options; the right panel shows the analysis output. NB. The
“error %” indicates the size of the error in the integration routine
relative to the Bayes factor, similar to a coefficient of variation
Fig. 6 JASP screenshot for the one-sided test of the kitchen roll replication experiment (Wagenmakers et al., 2015). The left panel shows the data
in spreadsheet format; the middle panel shows the analysis input options; the right panel shows the analysis output
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The output for the order-restricted test is shown in the
right panel of Fig. 6. As expected, incorporating the knowl-
edge that the observed effect is in the direction opposite
to the one that was hypothesized increases the relative
evidence in favor of H0 (see also Matzke et al., 2015).
Specifically, the Bayes factor has risen from 3.71 to 7.74,
meaning that the observed data are 7.74 times more likely
under H0 than under H+.
As an aside, note that under H+ the posterior distribution
is concentrated near zero but does not have mass on nega-
tive values, in accordance with the order-restriction imposed
by H+. In contrast, the classical one-sided confidence inter-
val ranges from −.23 to ∞. This classical interval contrasts
sharply with its Bayesian counterpart, and, even though
the classical interval is mathematically well-defined (i.e.,
it contains all values that would not be rejected by a one-
sided α = .05 significance test, see also Wagenmakers
et al., 2017), we submit that most researchers will find the
classical result neither intuitive nor informative.
Next we turn to a robustness analysis and quantify the
evidential impact of the width r of the Cauchy prior dis-
tribution. The middle panel of Fig. 7 shows that the option
“Bayes factor robustness check” is ticked, and this pro-
duces the upper plot in the right panel of Fig. 7. When the
Cauchy prior with r equals zero, H1 is identical to H+,
and the Bayes factor equals 1. As the width r increases
and H+ starts to predict that the effect is positive, the
evidence in favor of H0 increases; for the JASP default
value r = .707, the Bayes factor BF0+ = 7.73; for Jef-
freys’s default r = 1, the Bayes factor BF0+ = 10.75;
and for the “ultrawide” prior r = √2 ≈ 1.41, the
Bayes factor BF0+ = 15.04. Thus, over a wide range of
plausible values for the prior width r , the data provide mod-
erate to strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
H0.
Finally, the middle panel of Fig. 7 also shows that the
options “Sequential analysis” and “robustness check” are
ticked, and these together produce the lower plot in the right
panel of Fig. 7. The sequential analysis is of interest here
because it was part of the experiment’s sampling plan, and
because it underscores how researchers can monitor and
visualize the evidential flow as the data accumulate. Closer
examination of the plot reveals that for the preregistered
value of r = 1, Wagenmakers et al. (2015) did not adhere to
their preregistered sampling plan to stop data collection as
soon as BF0+ > 10 or BF+0 > 10: after about 55 partici-
pants, the dotted line crosses the threshold of BF0+ > 10 but
data collection nonetheless continued. Wagenmakers et al.
Fig. 7 JASP screenshot for the one-sided test of the kitchen roll replication experiment (Wagenmakers et al., 2015). The right panel shows the
analysis output: the upper plot is a robustness analysis, and the bottom plot is a sequential analysis combined with a robustness analysis
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(2015, p. 3) explain: “This occurred because data had to be
entered into the analysis by hand and this made it more dif-
ficult to monitor the Bayes factor continually. In practice,
the Bayes factor was checked every few days. Thus, we con-
tinued data collection until we reached our predetermined
stopping criterion at the point of checking.”
One of the advantages of the sequential robustness plot is
that it provides a visual impression of when the Bayes fac-
tors for the different priors have converged, in the sense that
their difference on the log scale is constant (e.g., Gronau
& Wagenmakers, in press). For the current situation, the
convergence has occurred after testing approximately 35
participants. To understand why the difference between the
log Bayes factors becomes constant after an initial num-
ber of observations, consider data y that consists of two
batches, y1 and y2. As mentioned above, from the law of
conditional probability we have BF0+(y) = BF0+(y1) ×
BF0+(y2 | y1). Note that this expression highlights that
Bayes factors for different batches of data (e.g., partic-
ipants, experiments) may not be multiplied blindly; the
second factor, BF0+(y2 | y1), equals the relative evidence
from the second batch y2, after the prior distributions have
been properly updated using the information extracted from
the first batch y1 (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 333). Rewriting the
above expression on the log scale we obtain log BF0+(y) =
log BF0+(y1) + log BF0+(y2 | y1). Now assume y1 con-
tains sufficient data such that, regardless of the value of
prior width r under consideration, approximately the same
posterior distribution is obtained. In most situations, this
posterior convergence happens relatively quickly. This pos-
terior distribution is then responsible for generating the
Bayes factor for the second component, log BF0+(y2 | y1),
and it is therefore robust against differences in r .6 Thus,
models with different values of r will make different pre-
dictions for data from the first batch y1. However, after
observing a batch y1 that is sufficiently large, the models
have updated their prior distribution to a posterior distri-
bution that is approximately similar; consequently, these
models then start to make approximately similar predic-
tions, resulting in a change in the log Bayes factor that is
approximately similar as well.
In the first example we noted that the Bayes factor grades
the evidence provided by the data on an unambiguous and
6This also suggests that one can develop a Bayes factor that is robust
against plausible changes in r: first, sacrifice data y1 until the posterior
distributions are similar; second, monitor and report the Bayes factor
for the remaining data y2. This is reminiscent of the idea that under-
lies the so-called intrinsic Bayes factor (Berger and Pericchi, 1996), a
method that also employs a “training sample” to update the prior distribu-
tions before the test is conducted using the remaining data points.
The difference is that the intrinsic Bayes factor selects a training sample
of minimum size, being just large enough to identify the model parameters.
Table 1 A descriptive and approximate classification scheme for
the interpretation of Bayes factors BF10 (Lee & Wagenmakers 2013;
adjusted from Jeffreys 1961)
Bayes factor Evidence category
> 100 Extreme evidence for H1
30 - 100 Very strong evidence for H1
10 - 30 Strong evidence for H1
3 - 10 Moderate evidence for H1
1 - 3 Anecdotal evidence for H1
1 No evidence
1/3 - 1 Anecdotal evidence for H0
1/10 - 1/3 Moderate evidence for H0
1/30 - 1/10 Strong evidence for H0
1/100 - 1/30 Very strong evidence for H0
< 1/100 Extreme evidence for H0
continuous scale. Nevertheless, the sequential analysis plots
in JASP make reference to discrete categories of evidential
strength. These categories were inspired by Jeffreys (1961,
Appendix B). Table 1 shows the classification scheme used
by JASP. We replaced Jeffreys’s labels “worth no more than
a bare mention” with “anecdotal” (i.e., weak, inconclusive),
“decisive” with “extreme”, and “substantial” with “moder-
ate” (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013); the moderate range may
be further subdivided by using “mild” for the 3-6 range
and retaining “moderate” for the 6-10 range.7 These labels
facilitate scientific communication but should be considered
only as an approximate descriptive articulation of differ-
ent standards of evidence. In particular, we may paraphrase
Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989) and state that, surely, God
loves the Bayes factor of 2.5 nearly as much as he loves the
Bayes factor of 3.5.
Example 3: a Bayesian one-way ANOVA to test
whether pain threshold depends on hair color
An experiment conducted at the University of Melbourne
in the 1970s suggested that pain threshold depends on hair
color (McClave & Dietrich, 1991, Exercise 10.20). In the
7The present authors are not all agreed on the usefulness of such
descriptive classifications of Bayes factors. All authors agree, however,
that the advantage of Bayes factors is that –unlike for instance p val-
ues which are dichotomized into “significant” and “non-significant”–
the numerical value of the Bayes factor can be interpreted directly. The
strength of the evidence is not dependent on any conventional verbal
description, such as “strong”.
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Fig. 8 Boxplots and jittered data points for the hair color experiment.
Figure created with JASP
experiment, a pain tolerance test was administered to 19 par-
ticipants who had been divided into four groups according to
hair color: light blond, dark blond, light brunette, and dark
brunette.8 Figure 8 shows the boxplots and the jittered data
points. There are visible differences between the conditions,
but the sample sizes are small.
The data may be analyzed with a classical one-way
ANOVA. This yields a p-value of .004, suggesting that the
null hypothesis of no condition differences may be rejected.
But how big is the evidence in favor of an effect? To
answer this question we now analyze the data in JASP using
the Bayesian ANOVA methodology proposed by Rouder
et al. (2012) (see also Rouder et al., in press). As was the
case for the t-test, we assign Cauchy priors to effect sizes.
What is new is that the Cauchy prior is now multivari-
ate, and that effect size in the ANOVA model is defined in
terms of distance to the grand mean.9 The analysis requires
that the user opens the data file containing 19 pain tol-
erance scores in one column and 19 hair colors in the
other column. As before, each row corresponds to a par-
ticipant. The user then selects “ANOVA” from the ribbon,
followed by “Bayesian ANOVA”. In the associated analy-
sis menu, the user drags the variable “Pain Tolerance” to
the input field labeled “Dependent Variable” and drags the
variable “Hair Color” to the input field “Fixed Factors”.
8The data are available at http://www.statsci.org/data/oz/blonds.html.
9The Cauchy prior width rt for the independent samples t-tests yields
the same result as a two-group one-way ANOVA with a fixed effect
scale factor rA equal to rt /
√
2. With the default setting rt = 1/2 ·
√
2,
this produces rA = 0.5. In sum, for the default prior settings in JASP
the independent samples t-test and the two-group one-way ANOVA
yield the same result. For examples see https://cran.r-project.org/web/
packages/BayesFactor/vignettes/priors.html.
Fig. 9 JASP output table for the Bayesian ANOVA of the hair color
experiment. The blue text underneath the table shows the annotation
functionality that can help communicate the outcome of a statistical
analysis
The resulting output table with Bayesian results is shown
in Fig. 9.
The first column of the output table, “Models”, lists the
models under consideration. The one-way ANOVA features
only two models: the “Null model” that contains the grand
mean, and the “Hair Color” model that adds an effect of
hair color. The next point of interest is the “BF10” column;
this column shows the Bayes factor for each row-model
against the null model. The first entry is always 1 because
the null model is compared against itself. The second entry
is 11.97, which means that the model with hair color pre-
dicts the observed data almost 12 times as well as the null
model. As was the case for the output of the t-test, the right-
most column, “% error”, indicates the size of the error in
the integration routine relative to the Bayes factor; similar
to a coefficient of variation, this means that small variability
is more important when the Bayes factor is ambiguous than
when it is extreme.
Column “P(M)” indicates prior model probabilities
(which the current version of JASP sets to be equal across all
models at hand); column “P(M|data)” indicates the updated
probabilities after having observed the data. Column “BFM”
indicates the degree to which the data have changed the
prior model odds. Here the prior model odds equals 1
(i.e., 0.5/0.5) and the posterior model odds equals almost
12 (i.e., 0.923/0.077). Hence, the Bayes factor equals the
posterior odds. JASP offers the user “Advanced Options”
that can be used to change the prior width of the Cauchy
prior for the model parameters. As the name suggest, we
recommend that the user exercises this freedom only in
the presence of substantial knowledge of the underlying
statistical framework.
Currently JASP does not offer post-hoc tests to exam-
ine pairwise differences in one-way ANOVA. Such post-hoc
tests have not yet been developed in the Bayesian ANOVA
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Fig. 10 Relation between voice pitch, gender, and height (in inches)
for data from 235 singers in the New York Choral Society in 1979.
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Figure created with JASP
framework. In future work we will examine whether post-
hoc tests can be constructed by applying a Bayesian correc-
tion for multiple comparisons (i.e., Scott & Berger, 2006,
2010; Stephens & Balding, 2009). Discussion of this topic
would take us too far afield.
Example 4: a Bayesian two-way ANOVA
for singers’ height as a function of gender and pitch
The next data set concerns the heights in inches of the 235
singers in the New York Choral Society in 1979 (Chambers,
Cleveland, Kleiner, & Tukey, 1983).10 The singers’ voices
were classified according to voice part (e.g., soprano, alto,
tenor, bass) and recoded to voice pitch (i.e., very low, low,
high, very high). Figure 10 shows the relation between pitch
and height separately for men and women.
Our analysis concerns the extent to which the depen-
dent variable “height” is associated with gender (i.e., male,
female) and/or pitch. This question can be examined statis-
tically using a 2 × 4 ANOVA. Consistent with the visual
impression from Fig. 10, a classical analysis yields signif-
icant results for both main factors (i.e., p < .001 for both
gender and pitch) but fails to yield a significant result for
the interaction (i.e., p = .52). In order to assess the extent
to which the data support the presence and absence of these
effects we now turn to a Bayesian analysis.
In order to conduct this analysis in JASP, the user first
opens the data set and then navigates to the “Bayesian
ANOVA” input panel as was done for the one-way ANOVA.
In the associated analysis menu, the user then drags the
10Data available at https://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-devel/library/lattice/
html/singer.html.
variable “Height” to the input field labeled “Dependent
Variable” and drags the variables “Gender” and “Pitch” to
the input field “Fixed Factors”. The resulting output table
with Bayesian results is shown in Fig. 11.
The first column of the output table, “Models”, lists the
five models under consideration: the “Null model” that con-
tains only the grand mean, the “Gender” model that contains
the effect of gender, the “Pitch” model that contains the
effect of Pitch, the “Gender + Pitch” model that contains
both main effects, and finally the “Gender + Pitch + Gen-
der × Pitch” model that includes both main effects and
the interaction. Consistent with the principle of marginal-
ity, JASP does not include interactions in the absence of the
component main effects; for instance, the interaction-only
model “Gender × Pitch” may not be entertained without
also adding the two main effects (for details, examples,
and rationale see Bernhardt & Jung, 1979, Griepentrog,
Ryan, & Smith 1982, McCullagh & Nelder, 1989; Nelder,
1998, 2000; Peixoto, 1987, 1990; Rouder, Engelhardt, et al.,
in press; Rouder, Morey, et al., in press; Venables, 2000).
Now consider the BF10 column. All models (except
perhaps for Pitch) receive overwhelming evidence in com-
parison to the Null model. The model that outperforms the
Null model the most is the two main effects model, Gender
+ Pitch. Adding the interaction makes the model less com-
petitive. The evidence against including the interaction is
roughly a factor of ten. This can be obtained as 8.192e+39 /
8.864e+38 ≈ 9.24. Thus, the data are 9.24 times more likely
under the two main effects model than under the model that
adds the interaction.
Column “P(M)” indicates the equal assignment of
prior model probability across the five models; column
“P(M|data)” indicates the posterior model probabilities.
Almost all posterior mass is centered on the two main
effects model and the model that also includes the inter-
action. Column “BFM” indicates the change from prior to
posterior model odds. Only the two main effects model has
received support from the data in the sense that the data have
increased its model probability.
Above we wished to obtain the Bayes factor for the main
effects only model versus the model that adds the inter-
action. We accomplished this objective by comparing the
strength of the Bayes factor against the Null model for
models that exclude or include the critical interaction term.
However, this Bayes factor can also be obtained directly. As
shown in Fig. 12, the JASP interface allows the user to spec-
ify Gender and Pitch as nuisance variables, which means
that they are included in every model, including the Null
model. The Bayes factor of interest is BF10 = 0.108; when
inverted, this yields BF01 = 1/0.108 = 9.26, confirming
the result obtained above through a simple calculation. The
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Fig. 11 JASP output table for the Bayesian ANOVA of the singers data. Note that JASP uses exponential notation to represent large numbers; for
instance, “3.807e +37” represents 3.807 × 1037
fact that the numbers are not identical is due to the numer-
ical approximation; the error percentage is indicated in the
right-most column.
In sum, the Bayesian ANOVA reveals that the data pro-
vide strong support for the two main effects model over any
of the simpler models. The data also provide good support
against including the interaction term.
Finally, as described in Cramer et al. (2016), the multi-
way ANOVA harbors a multiple comparison problem. As
for the one-way ANOVA, this problem can be addressed
by applying the proper Bayesian correction method (i.e.,
Scott & Berger 2006, 2010; Stephens & Balding,2009). This
correction has not yet been implemented in JASP.
Example 5: a Bayesian two-way repeated measures
ANOVA for people’s hostility towards arthropods
In an online experiment, Ryan, Wilde, and Crist (2013)
presented over 1300 participants with pictures of eight
arthropods. For each arthropod, participants were asked to
rate their hostility towards that arthropod, that is, “...the
extent to which they either wanted to kill, or at least in
some way get rid of, that particular insect” (p. 1297). The
arthropods were selected to vary along two dimensions with
two levels: disgustingness (i.e., low disgusting and high dis-
gusting) and frighteningness (i.e., low frighteningness and
high frighteningness). Figure 13 shows the arthropods and
the associated experimental conditions. For educational pur-
poses, we ignore the gender factor, we ignore the fact that
the ratings are not at all normally distributed, we analyze
data from a subset of 93 participants, and we side-step the
nontrivial question of whether to model the item-effects.
The pertinent model is a linear mixed model, and the only
difference with respect to the previous example is that we
now require a prior for the new random factor –in this case,
participants– which is set a little wider because we assume
a priori that participants are variable in the main effect (for
an in-depth discussion see Rouder et al., in press).
Our analysis asks whether and how people’s hostility
towards arthropods depends on their disgustingness and
frighteningness. As each participant’s rated all eight arthro-
pods, these data can be analyzed using a repeated mea-
sures 2 × 2 ANOVA. A classical analysis reveals that the
main effects of disgustingness and frighteningness are both
highly significant (i.e., p’s < .001) whereas the interac-
tion is not significant (p = 0.146). This is consistent with
the data as summarized in Fig. 14: arthropods appear to
be particularly unpopular when they are high rather than
low in disgustingness, and when they are high rather than
low in frighteningness. The data do not show a compelling
interaction. To assess the evidence for and against the
presence of these effects we now turn to a Bayesian analysis.
To conduct the Bayesian analysis the user first needs
to open the data set in JASP.11 Next the user selects the
“Bayesian Repeated Measures ANOVA” input panel that is
nested under the ribbon option “ANOVA”. Next the user
needs to name the factors (here “Disgust” and “Fright”) and
their levels (here “LD”, “HD”, and “LF”, “HF”). Finally
the input variables need to be dragged to the matching
“Repeated Measures Cells”.
The analysis produces the output shown in the top panel
of Fig. 15. As before, the column “Models” lists the five dif-
ferent models under consideration. The BF10 column shows
that compared to the Null model, all other models (except
perhaps the Disgust-only model) receive overwhelming sup-
port from the data. The model that receives the most support
against the Null model is the two main effects model, Dis-
gust + Fright. Adding the interaction decreases the degree
of this support by a factor of 3.240/1.245 = 2.6. This is
11The data set is available on the project OSF page and from within
JASP (i.e., File → Open → Examples → Bugs).
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Fig. 12 JASP screenshot and output table for the Bayesian ANOVA of the singers data, with Gender and Pitch added as nuisance factors
the Bayes factor in favor of the two main effects model ver-
sus the model that also includes the interaction. The same
result could have been obtained directly by adding “Dis-
gust” and “Fright” as nuisance variables, as was illustrated
in the previous example.
The “P(M)” column shows the uniform distribution of
prior model probabilities across the five candidate mod-
els, and the “P(M|data)” column shows the posterior model
probabilities. Finally, the “BFM” column shows the change
from prior model odds to posterior model odds. This Bayes
factor also favors the two main effects model, but at the
same time indicates mild support in favor of the interaction
model. The reason for this discrepancy (i.e., a Bayes factor
of 2.6 against the interaction model versus a Bayes fac-
tor of 1.5 in favor of the interaction model) is that these
Bayes factors address different questions: The Bayes fac-
tor of 2.6 compares the interaction model against the two
main effects model (which happens to be the model that
is most supported by the data), whereas the Bayes factor
of 1.5 compares the interaction model against all candidate
models, some of which receive almost no support from the
data. Both analyses are potentially of interest. Specifically,
when the two main effects model decisively outperforms
the simpler candidate models then it may be appropriate
Fig. 13 The arthropod stimuli used in Ryan and Wilde (2013). Each cell in the 2 × 2 repeated measures design contains two arthropods. The
original stimuli did not show the arthropod names. Figure adjusted from Ryan and Wilde (2013)
72 Psychon Bull Rev (2018) 25:58–76
Fig. 14 Hostility ratings for arthropods that differ in disgusting-
ness (i.e., LD for low disgusting and HD for high disgusting) and
frighteningness (i.e., LF for low frighteningness and HF for high
frighteningness). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Data
kindly provided by Ryan and Wilde (2013). Figure created with
JASP
to assess the importance of the interaction term by com-
paring the two main effects model against the model that
adds the interaction. However, it may happen that the sim-
pler candidate models outperform the two main effects
model – in other words, the two main effects model has
predicted the data relatively poorly compared to the Null
model or one of the single main effects models. In such
situations it is misleading to test the importance of the
interaction term by solely focusing on a comparion to the
poorly performing two main effects model. In general we
recommend radical transparency in statistical analysis; an
informative report may present the entire table shown in
Fig. 15. In this particular case, both Bayes factors (i.e.,
2.6 against the interaction model, and 1.5 in favor of the
interaction model) are “not worth more than a bare men-
tion” (Jeffreys, 1961, Appendix B); moreover, God loves
these Bayes factors almost an equal amount, so it may well
be argued that the discrepancy here is more apparent than
real.
As the number of factors grows, so does the number of
models. With many candidate models in play, it may be
risky to base conclusions on a comparison involving a small
subset. In Bayesian model averaging (BMA; e.g., Etz &
Wagenmakers, in press; Haldane 1932; Hoeting, Madigan,
Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999) the goal is to retain model selec-
tion uncertainty by averaging the conclusions from each
candidate model, weighted by that model’s posterior plausi-
bility. In JASP this is accomplished by ticking the “Effects”
input box, which results in an output table shown in the
bottom panel of Fig. 15.
In our example, the averaging in BMA occurs over the
models shown in the Model Comparison table (top panel
of Fig. 15). For instance, the factor “Disgust” features in
three models (i.e., Disgust only, Disgust + Fright, and Dis-
gust + Fright + Disgust * Fright). Each model has a prior
model probability of 0.2, so the summed prior probabil-
ity of the three models that include disgust equals 0.6;
this is known as the prior inclusion probability for Dis-
gust (i.e., the column P(incl)). After the data are observed
we can similarly consider the sum of the posterior model
Fig. 15 JASP screenshot for the output tables of the Bayesian ANOVA for the arthropod experiment. The top table shows the model-based
analysis, whereas the bottom panels shows the analysis of effects, averaging across the models that contain a specific factor. See text for details
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probabilities for the models that include disgust, yielding
4.497e-9 + 0.712 + 0.274 = 0.986. This is the poste-
rior inclusion probability (i.e., column P(incl|data)). The
change from prior to posterior inclusion odds is given in
the column “BFInclusion”. Averaged across all candidate
models, the data strongly support inclusion of both main
factors Disgust and Fright. The interaction only receives
weak support. In fact, the interaction term occurs only in
a single model, and therefore its posterior inclusion proba-
bility equals the posterior model probability of that model
(i.e., the one that contains the two main effects and the
interaction).
It should be acknowledged that the analysis of repeated
measures ANOVA comes with a number of challenges and
caveats. The development of Bayes factors for crossed-
random effect structures is still a topic of ongoing research.
And in general, JASP currently does not feature an exten-
sive suite of estimation routines to assess the extent to
which generic model assumptions (e.g., sphericity) are
violated.
Future directions for Bayesian analyses in JASP
The present examples provides a selective overview of
default Bayesian inference in the case of the correlation test,
t-test, one-way ANOVA, two-way ANOVA, and two-way
repeated measures ANOVA. In JASP, other analyses can
be executed in similar fashion (e.g., for contingency tables,
Jamil, Ly, et al., in press, Jamil, Marsman, et al., in press;
Scheibehenne, Jamil, & Wagenmakers, in press; or for linear
regression Rouder & Morey, 2012). A detailed discussion of
the entire functionality of JASP is beyond the scope of this
article.
In the near future, we aim to expand the Bayesian reper-
toire of JASP, both in terms of depth and breadth. In terms
of depth, our goal is to provide more and better graphing
options, more assumption tests, more nonparametric tests,
post-hoc tests, and corrections for multiplicity. In terms
of breadth, our goal is to include modules that offer the
functionality of the BAS package (i.e., Bayesian model
averaging in regression, Clyde, 2016), the informative
model comparison approach (e.g., Gu, Mulder, Decovic´, &
Hoijtink, 2014; Gu, 2016; Mulder, 2014, 2016), and a more
flexible and subjective prior specification approach (e.g.,
Dienes, 2011, 2014, 2016; Gronau et al., 2017). By mak-
ing the additional functionality available as add-on modules,
beginning users are shielded from the added complexity
that such options add to the interface. In the short-term
we also aim to develop educational materials that make
JASP output easier to interpret and to teach to undergradu-
ate students. This entails writing a JASP manual, developing
course materials, writing course books, and designing a
Massive Open Online Course.
Our long-term goal is for JASP to facilitate several
aspects of statistical practice. Free and user-friendly, JASP
has the potential to benefit both education and research.
By featuring both classical and Bayesian analyses, JASP
implicitly advocates a more inclusive statistical approach.
JASP also aims to assist with data preparation and aggrega-
tion; currently, this requires that JASP launches and interacts
with an external editor (see our data-editing video at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dT-iAU9Zuc&t=70s); in the
future, JASP will have its own editing functionality includ-
ing filtering and outlier exclusion. Finally, by offering the
ability to save, annotate, and share statistical output, JASP
promotes a transparent way of communicating one’s sta-
tistical results. An increase in statistical transparency and
inclusiveness will result in science that is more reliable and
more replicable.
As far as the continued development of JASP is con-
cerned, our two main software developers and several core
team members of the JASP team have tenured positions. The
Psychological Methods Group at the University of Amster-
dam is dedicated to long-term support for JASP, and in 2017
we have received four million euro to set up projects that
include the development of JASP as a key component. The
JASP code is open-source and will always remain freely
available online. In sum, JASP is here to stay.
Concluding comments
In order to promote the adoption of Bayesian procedures
in psychology, we have developed JASP, a free and open-
source statistical software program with an interface famil-
iar to users of SPSS. Using JASP, researchers can obtain
results from Bayesian techniques easily and without tears.
Dennis Lindley once said that “Inside every Non-Bayesian,
there is a Bayesian struggling to get out” (Jaynes, 2003).
We hope that software programs such as JASP will act to
strengthen the resolve of one’s inner Bayesian and pave
the road for a psychological science in which innovative
hypotheses are tested using coherent statistics.
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Fig. 16 A dart board analogy to intuit the strength of evidence that a Bayes factor provides. Figure available at https://osf.io/m6bi8/ under under
a CC-BY license
Appendix: Visualizing the strength of evidence
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